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Abstract 
Business people are receiving conflicting advice about the routes to competitive 
advantage.  One set of theories says the key to advantage lies in market positioning: 
looking outside the firm. The "resource based" view exhons business people to focus 
on their finns' existing core competences and assets and how these might be expanded: 
looking inside the company.  In this paper we focus on linking the two.  We begin by 
tracing Poner's cost and differentiation drivers back to the underlying assets on which 
they draw.  Core competences are then viewed as catalvsts which reduce the time and 
cost required for a business to expand its asset base in ways which allow it to deliver a 
more competitive product.  The role of core competences is inherently dynamic: they 
help companies build new assets which can enhance their competitive advantage, enable 
them to meet the needs of changing markets and diversify into new ones. 
It is then critical to know which types of assets, and hence which core competences, 
will be most advantageous to a firm in a panicular market environment.  We show 
empirically that pan of the answer is to be found by analysing differences in the value 
of customer relationships, channel and process experience assets across different 
markets.  By examining these differences, strategists can gain a better understanding of 
where corporate diversifiers can use their core competences to gain an advantage in 
competing for new business opponunities against independent stan-ups; and where 
new ventures can succeed despite lack of access to corporate competences. "The essential is invisible to the eye" 
-A. de Saint-Exupery, The Little Prince 
Introduction 
Today's discussions about competitive advantage give conflicting advice to  the 
business world!.  One school of thought views competitive advantage primarily as a 
function of inherent industry attractiveness and the market positioning of individual 
fmns2.  It extols the benefits of looking "outward". An alternative, and increasingly 
vocal, school emphasizes the bundle of resources in the fonn of tangible and intangible 
assets on which the finn can draw.  It advises business people to focus on expanding 
their asset stocks and capabilities as the basis for sustained competitive advantage3. All 
too often, the debate between these "schools" has become a "dialogue of the deaf'. 
Some proponents of the latter "resource-based" view hail it as  a  new paradigm, 
sweeping away the old under banners like "Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules 
of  Corporate Strategy"  (Stalk, Evans and Shulman, 1992).  Others in turn proclaim 
that "the resource-based view cannot be an alternative theory of strategy  ... "  (Porter, 
1992:  108). In this paper we argue that there are important payoffs to be gained by 
linking and integrating the two views. 
More specifically, we develop the following basic propositions concerning the links 
between core competences and competitive positioning based on market analysis: 
•  that analyses of markets and competitors have an important role in identifying 
which competences are key in a particular market environment.  The critical 
competences will be those that can be used to build sources of advantage 
which are slow and costly for competitors to imitate.  Traditional competitive 
strategy frameworks therefore help practitioners identify which competences 
to concentrate on. 
• that transfer of core competences within a corporate group will provide a 
powerful  basis  for  entry  only  in  market  environments  with  certain 
1 make high profits in "unattractive" markets -- industry is not destiny.  Large scale 
statistical studies of the "industry effect", while they produce different quantitative 
estimates, generally agree that only between 16% and 19% of the total variations in 
profit  between business  units  can  be directly  explained by  industry  variables 
(Schmalensee, 1985, Rumelt, 1991)5.  Being in an "attractive" industry is no guarantee 
for success, while lack of  industry attractiveness is not a sentence to poor performance. 
Positioning within an industry (or, more correctly, a market) has therefore attracted 
increasing attention as a key determinant of firm profitability.  Investigators like Porter 
(1980, 1985) have explained differential performance among competitors as a function 
of each firm's success in harnessing the "drivers of competitive advantage" in a 
particular industry so as to place themselves in a more advantageous position relative to 
"industry forces" compared with rivals.  If scale is an important driver of cost 
leadership, for example, those firms who operate efficient scale plants will be better 
positioned to protect their profits against the power of buyers or suppliers and the threat 
of substitutes or entrants compared with sub-scale competitors. If  reliable, responsive 
service is a critical driver of differentiation advantage, those firms who can offer such 
service will be positioned to make higher profits than rivals who offer lower reliability 
or slower response times.  Porter's generic list of drivers is summarized on the right 
hand side of  Table 1. 
Market positioning - putting it into practice 
To suggest to a manager that his company needs to produce in a large scale plant in 
order to be profitable in a particular industry is a bit like telling a pauper that if  he wants 
to be rich he should operate a gold mine.  Two questions immediately arise: 
• how would I go about obtaining access to a gold mine or even a large scale 
plant? (What Bogaert, Martens and Van Cauwenbergh in this volume: figure 
1, term "having" resources); 
• what competences and skills do I need to successfully operate my gold mine 
or large scale plant once I have access to it? (Bogaert, Martens and Van 
Cauwenbergh, op. cit., term these "doing" resources). 
It is obvious that for "drivers of advantage" to become operational we need to consider 
their link to the assets which underpin them and, in turn, the process by which access 
to these assets are obtained and developed. Recently Porter (1992: 109) has recognized 
3 To illustrate these relationships in more detail let us return to the example of scale as 
one of the most common drivers referred to in industry analysis.  As a newly created. 
business unit I might have been endowed with a large scale plant from my parent. 
Alternatively, blessed with sufficient financial capacity, I might go to a "turnkey" 
engineering company and contract for its construction.  Even if I lack the financial 
capacity, the option of leasing large scale capacity may be available, as would be the 
case with a Boeing 747 needed by a start-up, long distance airline. 
To reap the benefits of scale, however, I need more than just access to a large scale 
plant.  I need to  be able to operate it.  This means access to the relevant process 
experience.  I also need to be able to sell the mass output of such a plant.  This may 
require assets such as access to distribution channels or the consumer brand franchise 
necessary to overcome customer risk aversion and search costs.  Exploiting the benefits 
of even a relatively straightforward driver like scale is therefore apt to require the 
services of a complex bundle of tangible and intangible assets as a prerequisite. 
The same is true for high and stable capacity utilization, another imponant cost driver. 
It can only be achieved. to the extent that the finn has the thorough market knowledge, 
adequate infonnation systems, customer loyalty and consistent quality to keep capacity 
as high as possible without incurring major bottlenecks. 
The need to  secure access to the right assets is  equally compelling in the case of 
differentiation drivers.  For example, a firm's ability to learn how to perform an 
activity better may be an imponant driver of uniqueness.  A fast-learning fInn could be 
more responsive to changing consumer needs and preferences.  However, several 
assets are required in order to realize this advantage: good information technology 
systems to facilitate the collection, processing and dissemination of knowledge and 
information; motivated employees and a corporate culture geared towards stimulating 
learning and adapting to change; skilled managers able to facilitate the learning process 
etc. 
Or take the example of  Rockwell International in water meters: its policy choice to offer 
meters with superior reliability and durability would only payoff if it could obtain 
premium prices to more than offset the higher cost involved, e.g.  by using more 
expensive bronze pans6.  Higher prices in turn could only be obtained. thanks to 
channel assets (in the forms of its efficient distribution network) and customer assets 
5 • access may be obtained through sharing of the asset with a sister business 
unit,  or alliance partner.  Much of the  literature -on  diversification  has 
discussed the possibilities of sharing as a basis for entry into new, but related 
businesses.  This route encompasses the  sharing of tangible  assets  like 
facilities through to intangibles, such as debt capacity. 
• fmally, access may be obtained by accumulating the asset inside the company 
over time. 
Asset services which are both tradeable and non-specific to a particular industry or 
product line can, in principle, be accessed via any of these routes.  Relative costs will 
act as the deciding factor. Other assets will be freely tradeable, but industry-or product 
line-specific. In this case, sharing across business units in different indusnies will not 
be possible.  Instead, the necessary asset services would have to  be accessed through 
acquisition or accumulation, as illustrated in Figure  1. Tradeable assets of either of 
these types,  however,  are  unlikely  to  act as  a source of long-term, competitive 
advantage.  This is because, to the extent that any such an asset afforded supernormal 
returns to one or more players, it would be quickly acquired by rivals.  As a result, the 
initial competitive advantage would disappear.  Where such assets were in limited 
supply, asset prices would be bid up, causing the rate ofreturn to the holder to fall back 
. to competitive levels when properly measured against the asset's new market value. 
< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
Consider, then, asset services which are "non-tradeable" because the transactions costs 
in exchanging them through a market mechanism are prohibitive or the underlying 
factor market is non-existent or not functioning as an efficient market  (Williamson, 
1975, Barney,  1986, Dierickx and Cool,  1989).  In  this case the necessary asset 
services can only be obtained via endowment, sharing within an organisation, or by the 
business unit accumulating the asset. 
Among these assets, those that can be accessed through endowment or sharing will 
tend to provide only shon-lived competitive advantage. This is because most assets will 
be subject to erosion over time (see e.g., Eaton and Lipsey [1980]).  Customer assets 
like brands, for example,  will decay as  new customers enter the market or former 
customers forget past experience or exit the market  The value of a stock of technical 
know-how will tend to erode in the face of innovation by competitors.  Patents will 
expire.  Thus, assets accessed through initial endowment or an initial asset base shared 
7 Core CODJDetences  As  Catalvsts to  Asset  AccuDJulation 
According to Dierickx and Cool (1989) there are four main factors which impede cheap 
and rapid asset accumulation: 
• time compression diseconomies: the extra cost associated with accumulating 
Ll--te required assets under time presslli-e  (u~e cost of  compressing a.., activiLj in 
time).  For example, it may take more than twice the amount of marketing to 
achieve in one year the same level of brand awareness as an  established 
competitor may have been able to develop over a period of two years (other 
things equal).  Similar relationships are likely to hold for other types of 
spending such as  R&D costs relative  to  the rate of product or process 
improvement 
• asset mass efficiencies:  some types of assets are more costly to accumulate 
when the fIrm's existing stock of that asset is small.  It is more difficult. for 
example, to build the customer base of a credit card when it has few existing 
users.  Prospective customers fear that if they sign up for an unknown card it 
will not be widely accepted at retail stores.  Worse still, the average costs per 
transaction will be high due to lack of network economies, making it  difficult 
to price the service competitively. 
• asset interconnectedness: the lack of  complementary assets can often impede a 
finn from a<;:cumulating an asset which its needs to successfully serve its 
market For example, it may be harder for a finn that lacks a service network 
to improve its product quality.  Without the in-house data on actual product 
performance  its own  service  network would provide,  the  targeting of 
improvements becomes more diffIcult. 
• causal ambiguity  : the uncenainty associated with pinpointing which specific 
factors or processes are required to accumulate a required asset (the precise 
chain of  causality is ambiguous)9.  For example,  a long list of  key assets may 
explain the success of Wal-Man in discount retailing in the U.S., but it is 
unclear which particular assets are really the critical ones.  Even if a possible 
imitator could pinpoint these, it would still need to understand how to go 
about accumulating them10. 
When the process necessary to accumulate an asset suffers from one or more of these 
impediments (or 'asset accumulation barriers'), all firms will face higher costs and 
9 Second, it is always important to recognize that the value of a core competence depends 
on the value of the asset it helps to create.  Thus, the more unique the customer benefits 
the resulting asset can deliver to a market, the more valuable is a firm's competence to 
build that asset. The danger of a  pUrely "inward looking" approach to exploiting 
competences is that they will be used to create assets which add little to the company's 
market strength.  For example, an excellent repair facility when what the market 
demands is a more reliable product. 
Third, as we move away from the concept of asset sharing towards asset building and 
competence deployment, the definition of  "business relatedness" changes.  This helps 
unearth  links  between  products  like  SLR cameras,  fax  machines,  calculators, 
photocopiers, bubble jet printers and cell analyzers -- to name a  few of Canon's. 
businesses -- despite little scope for direct asset sharing and few common components. 
Moreover, it challenges us to extend traditional defmitions of entry barriers built around 
the concept of markets separated by industry-specific assets  13 . 
It is also worth noting that core competences may playa role in increasing the ability of 
a business unit to build its asset portfolio in other ways.  Specifically: 
•  core competences may increase the potential for asset sharing (e.g. a company 
which licensed a process for manufacture of  LCD's may be unable to adapt 
the line to produce components fora new product market  By contrast, a firm 
.  with a core competence in LCD manufacturing technology may be able to 
successfully increase the flexibility of the line to produce the new product on 
the same equipment) 
•  core competences may assist a business to successfully integrate assets 
acquired in the external market.  (e.g. companies with certain organisational 
systems may be more successful in integrating acquisitions than others, some 
businesses have much greater competences in quickly operationalizing newly 
licensed technologies or in bringing new plants on stream after raising 
additional capital) 
Leveraging off  the core competences of  others 
It is not necessary for all of the competences a firm deploys in overcoming asset 
accumulation  barriers  to  be in-house, or even  within  a  corporate group.  Many 
11 operation we critical successfully underpinning this new way of better satisfying an 
existing market need. 
In this new competitive game many of the existing assets of established players were 
rendered obsolete.  In determining the right strategy to respond, however,  it was 
critical to understand which existing competences could help put a new asset base in 
place as well as where new competences would be required.  In the event players like 
Kodak were able to draw on their core competences to build a new business centering 
on sales of processing equipment and supplies like chemicals and treated papers to the 
"one hour" networks.  USIng these competences, augmented with additional ones, new 
assets from plant capacity through to sales, distribution and service networks were 
accumulated, along with the necessary experience to streamline the new business and 
improve its initial profitability. 
Identification and. deployment of its core competences, therefore, not only gives a 
company the opportunity to accelerate its rate of learning, share assets across the group, 
and assist it in the integration of newly acquired assets.  The ability to recognize and 
transfer competences is also essential in allowing a fInn to regenerate its asset base 
when faced with market "breakthroughs" which render existing assets obsolete by 
changing the rules of the competitive game. 
Structural  Indicators of the  Importance of Core Competences 
Thus far we have explored the links between market forces and core competences, as 
summarized in Figure 3.  But these links pose two further questions: 
• are their structural indicators that signal which core competences are likely to 
be a potential source of advantage in a particular market? 
• are there any systematic relationships between market structure and the 
importance of access to these competences as a source of competitive 
advantage? 
In  what follows we provide a "first cut" empirical test to shed some light on these 
questions.  It is clear that not all types of fIrm-specifIc assets will be relevant for every 
business or market.  Our hypothesis is that differences between markets in the type of 
asset services required, the ways in which they can be obtained and the role of core 
13 Access to core competences in rapidly building successful brands is thus likely to be 
more important where the product is purchased frequently.  For items infrequently 
purchased, by contrast, the product is more likely to win customers on its independent 
merits since buyers' brand loyalty will have been eroded by time.  Core competences in 
brand building will be less critical in environments where purchases are infrequent. 
Frequency of purchase can be measured by the proportion of  product lines belonging to 
a given industry for which the user generally purchases with a frequency of more than 
once per year (FQPUR). 
3.  Product customization (products made to  order) vs. standardization.  Successful 
made-to-order supply depends on a close relationship between manufacturer and 
customer with high exchange of information.  Once transactions cost investments have 
been made with established businesses it will be more difficult for a new business to 
break into such a customer relationship.  Not only is this a non-tradeable asset, but it is 
rather hard for newcomers to establish such relationship in a compressed timescale. 
The importance of product customization, measured by the % of products classified to 
the industry which are made to  order based on customer specifications (TORDER), 
therefore can be considered as  another structural indicator for the imponance of 
established custOmer contacts.  The handicap it represents to newcomers to the industry 
will be significantly lower however for businesses that can benefit from existing 
customer relationships with other units in the same company (sharing).  Likewise 
access to core competences in establishing, building and managing "made to order" 
customer relationship will also be more advantageous when TORDER is high. 
4.  Major purchase.  This structural indicator refers to the possibility of wiiming new 
customers, based on their risk attitude and the informational characteristics of the 
buyer-seller relationship in the market.  The risk associated with error for a major 
purchase may deter buyers from trying the product of a new business unit rather than 
continuing with established suppliers.  New firms here may face a "chicken and egg" 
dilemma: customers are reluctant to buy from a supplier without a demonstrable track 
record, yet the new firm cannot develop that track record quickly without a rapid 
buildup of its installed base (cf. asset mass efficiencies).  According to this argument, 
core competences in product launch, rapid ramp-up of production, and possibly brand 
creation would be especially advantageous in markets for "major" purchases. 
15 proves to.. be.  These considerations would argue that core competences in launching 
successful media campaigns would offer an advantage where brand awareness was 
important in underpinning competitive advantage. 
However, access to  media advertising and advertising agencies is quite open and 
competitive.  Advertising can be bought by independent newcomers under almost equal 
conditions as by established finns.  Moreover, since brands can be bought and sold, it 
may be possible to purchase the results of successful advertising in the past, thereby 
compensating for lack of core  competences  in  rapidly  building  a  new  brand. 
Funhermore, high advertising outlays in an industry may be a symptom of relatively 
high rate of brand erosion, reducing the effective impact of brands as a source of 
competitive advantage16.  It is therefore unclear as to whether core competences in 
media promotion will be systematically more important in advertising intensive markets 
which measure by expenditure on media advertising as a  %  of total sales value 
(MEDIA). 
II. Channel relationship indicators 
A second class of indicators refers to scope for building channel-related assets as a 
basis for competitive advantage.  Such assets are likely to  be more important in 
industries where a large portion of the products are sold through intermediaries and 
which rely heavily on 'push marketing'. 
7. Channel dependence.  We define channel dependence of a product as the degree to 
which the product requires gaining access to a distribution channel in order to reach the 
final customer, as opposed to the possibility of selling direct to the final user.  To the 
extent that obtaining channel access and "shelf space" is easier for those  with an 
established track record, we then would expect older firms to have a greater advantage 
where channel dependence was high, an advantage that is hard to trade on the open 
market, takes  time to accumulate and is  subject to  substantial scale and scope 
economies. 
Porter, 1976, for example, has argued that "for products sold through convenience 
outlets, ... gaining access to distribution actually becomes easier as the brand image 
matures." (page 28).  This reflects the fact that where goods must be sold through retail 
convenience stores a certain density of sales required to make it economic to handle the 
brand. 
17 the-an learning in their operation while older incumbents are left with less productive, 
earlier vintage equipment for wr.ich they cannot justify immediate replacement. 
Higher labor intensity will thus increase the potential importance of staff experience as 
an intangible asset, giving older firms more of an advantage over young businesses. 
However,  new  start-ups  belonging  to  a  corporate group  may benefit from  the 
accumulated experience of the parent and, more importantly, from a core competence in 
labor force training and human resource development. UK measures labor intensity as 
total employment over the total book value of plant and equipment  in the industry. 
10. The skill level of the labor force.  To the extent that skills are specific to the 
industry, young firms will be faced with the problem of hiring the necessary specialists 
and forming these recruits into a smoothly coordinated resource.  Contracting and then 
successfully  transferring complete teams with the necessary skills is notoriously 
difficult, particularly for businesses who are uncertain to survive. 
In industries where groups of skilled staff are an important source of advantage, young 
businesses are likely to be at a greater handicap compared with established rivals who 
have gradually evolved an  effective base of skilled staff with experience working 
together. This is not easy to acquire, given time-compression diseconomies and causal 
ambiguity.  A  core compelence in  developing  skilled staff again  may prove a 
tremendous benefit, fielping corporate diversifiers to overcome this potential barrier. 
SKILL  measures the proportion of "high-skilled" jobs in the industry as a percentage 
of total employment. 
11. R&D.  To the extent that success in R&D involves the accumulation of team 
experience which is largely non-tradeable, we could expect new businesses to be at a 
greater disadvantage as R&D intensity increases.  But new corporate subsidiaries may 
benefit from access ~o a corporate level core competencesin R&D management. Glaxo 
PIc., for example, is often thought to have a core competence in new drug development 
as already noted in Figure 2. 
The benefits of corporate affiliation may be offset, however, if a high R&D intensity 
were to signal a state of rapid technical change.  In this case, the value of the existing 
stock of  R&D would erode quickly generating opportunities for younger firms to build 
19 Table 2:  Indicators of the  Assets Required for Competitive Advantage 
Asset  type  &  specijicasset 
Customer  assets 
• customer loyalty (existing) 
• brand recognition (new customers) 
• installed base 
• service network 
• service quality 
Channel  assets 
• distribution network 
• dealer/distribulor/retailer loyalty 
Process  experience 
• technological know-how 
• functional experience 
• R&D capability/stock 
General  Assets 
• human capital 






























21 businesses. We tested this effect through the variable UN, the degree of unionization in 
the industry, measured by the % of total employees belonging to a union. 
Results 
Comparing the survival rates between our samples of firms established in the past five 
years, we find that corporate affiliates enjoy almost 50% higher probability of survival 
than independent startups facing the same market environments.  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that access to  the core competences accumulated within a corporate 
group helps a new subsidiary build its own asset base.  The "corporate nursery" seems 
to work. 
Theoretically at least, we might expect to find this benefit of corporate affiliation to  . 
continue even after a business became well established an accumulated its own. specific 
asset base.  Continued access to the core competences of the group should help an 
individual business to successively improve its assets and adjust to changing market 
demands faster than competitors, but in our sample it does not seem to do so.  The 
ability of corporate affiliates to  withstand the rough and tumble of competition is 
insignificantly different from established independent fInns once both samples have 
been in business for more than five years. 
If there are potential benefits of continued transfer of core competences between 
business units within a corporate group, we  are unable to find evidence that these 
benefits are successfully being exploited.  There are many possible explanations, 
including the  emergence of a  "not invented here" syndrome among established 
subsidiaries or the failure of the corporate centre either to identify the core competences 
of the group or to provide a mechanism to  transfer them between business units 
(Pralahad and Hamel, 1990). 
In order to further ~xplore how the benefits of access to the assets and competences of 
the centre and sister business units varies corporate affiliation, equations (1) and (2) 
were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares.  The statistical results are reported in 
Table 3.20 
23 Core competences and the corporate nursery 
Looking first at our paired samples of businesses 5 or less years old, the following 
implications of these statistical results are notable: 
•  in markets where customer relationships are important and costly to build, as 
signalled by a high degree of customer fragmentation and made-ta-order 
products,  access  to  corporate  group  assets  and  competences  brings 
significant benefits to young businesses as they struggle to accumulate the 
assets  neces~ary to compete.  Independent businesses which lack access to 
corporate cdinpetences are  at  a relative disadvantage in  these types  of 
environments  (positive  and  significant  coefficients  on  MCUST  and 
TORDER). 
• in markets with high channel dependence, corporate affiliates also have a 
substantial advantage over independent startups over the first five years after 
commencing operations (positive and significant coefficient on CHANNEL). 
This suggests that sharing of core competences in channel management across 
a corporation is important in helping new subsidiaries become successfully 
established in markets where the channel performance has a powerful impact 
on competitive advantage. 
• there is some evidence .that access to corporate skills is an advantage to a 
young business when media advertising plays a key role in the competitive 
armory, but this relationship is only weakly significant (positive coefficient on 
MEDIA). 
• in markets where the product represents a "major" spending decision for the 
consumer, by contrast, independent startups are relatively better off.  It seems 
that customers discount their existing relationships affiliates within the group 
and access to core competences when they make a very important purchase 
(negative and significant coefficient on MAJOR).  This would accord with the 
theory of "non-convenience" goods which suggests that buyers will invest 
more in collecting objective information when they go to make such purchases 
(Porter, 1976). 
25 and Hamel,  1990  that many corporations have  failed to  establish organisational 
mechanisms for the continuous transfer of their  core competences between their SBUs. 
Worse still, in markets where customers demand high levels of service, our results 
suggest that corporate affiliation can act as a long-run handicap to competitiveness 
(negative coefficient on  HSERV in equation 2). It may be that bureaucratic cultures in 
some large groups adversely  show up  as  poor service when  they  establish new 
subsidiaries22• 
Implications for  the Practitioner 
In this paper we have sought to forge links between the core competence framework 
and more  traditio~al market-competitor analysis.  The nature of these links has a 
number of important lessons for the business practitioner which may be summarized in 
four maxims. 
1.  Understand  exactly  which  competences  can  offer  competitive  advantage. 
Competences which  are  widespread among rivals will  seldom  offer the  firm  a 
competitive edge.  Those competences which enable a company to build assets that are 
slow and and costly for competitors to imitate are the ones that count.  These include 
assets like an efficient network of distributors,  a response system to deliver made-to-
order products,  or a brand-loyal customer base that competitors can neither buy off the 
shelf nor copy quickly; and accumulated process knowhow that equipment suppliers 
cannot provide.  It is the competences which can be deployed as catalysts in building 
these  kinds  of assets  more  quickly than competitors  that are  core  to  achieving 
competitive advantage. 
This rule is also relevant to diversification.  Competences will not underpin competitive 
advantage in a new market if the resulting assets can easily be replicated by incumbents 
or imitated by other entrants with similar capabilities. 
2.  Start/rom the market in deciding how to use your core competences.  The fact that 
an asset is  hard for competitors to  imitate is obviously not enough for it to yield 
advantage.  The market must also value the services that asset can deliver.  There is 
little point, for example, exploiting a competence in channel management if customers 
are increasingly buying direct from the manufacturer.  There would have been limited 
advantage in Kodak focusing its competences on building and managing yet larger 
scale, centralized film processing facilities when customers were demanding a one hour 
27 :~atas.~.ew subsidiaries develop new competences, they become "teachers" within their 
corporate groups, not only students of established SBUs. 
Exploiting core competences is not just a matter of looking inward.  Just as traditional 
competitive strategy must identify how a recommended market positioning is to  be 
achieved, and the assets required to do so, core competences must be assessed in terms 
of  the market benefits they can be used to unlock.  The real payoffs come from linking 
an understanding of competences with a rigorous analysis of market.  Forging these 
links will enable a fIrm  to use its core cornpetences in order to build or leverage its 
strategic  assets  so  as  to  become  a  pacesetter for  cost reductions  and  product 
differentiation in the areas that really count for competitive advantage. 
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Examples of the Impact of Core Competences 
In the race to develop a low cost, high yield production 
line for small-screen, colour LCD television sets the 
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substitute for time.  By drawing on its core competences 
in miniaturization, microprocessor design and material 
science -- all developed in its card calculator and watch 
businesses -- Casio was able to reduce the time 
compression diseconomies faced by other players.  Its 
core competences acted as a catalyst to rapidly 
establishing the assets necessary to manufacture the LCD 
television product in high volume at low cost. 
Entrants commonly face a 'catch 22' in establishing a 
dealer network: - they cannot build their skills and 
systems for providing excellent dealer support without 
access to a large or dense network of dealers; yet they 
cannot establish such a network without the necessary 
skills and systems.  Honda, however, was able to break 
this cycle when it entered the lawn mower business by 
using its core competences in dealer management 
originally developed in the motorcycle business to 
compensate for asset mass inefficiencies in building a 
new dealer network. 
Most entrants into the laser printer business lack crucial 
infonnation on product reliability which is available to 
competitors with a well established service network.  In 
seeking to improve their product and design capability 
they therefore suffer from interconnectedness of asset 
stocks.  Canon,  however, was able to reduce this 
disadvantage by deploying its core competence in the 
design of photocopier engines built on the basis of 
information from a large installed base and worldwide 
service network 
The process of developing and gaining approval for a 
new pharmaceutical product has often been likened to a 
"jackpot game" -- the relationship between R&D 
spending and successful new products is highly 
ambiguous.  Yet fInns with core competences in drug 
development, such as Glaxo, appear to be able to develop 
systems and procedures which reduce this causal 
ambiguity.  They must still play the proverbial "slot 
machine" in R&D, but compared with other potential 
entrants into a new market. their core competences allow 
them to improve their odds of success. 
34 ISee e.g. a series of Letters to the Editor, Harvard Business Review  May-June 1992: 162-172. 
2See, for example, Porter (1980,1985). 
3This characterization of the resource-based "school" is, of  course, a simplification. Particular authors 
have explored different aspects of the relationship between internal capabilities and competitive 
advantage; see e.g. Wemerfelt (1984), Dierickx and Cool (1989), Pralahad and Hamel (1990), Grant 
(1991), Barney (1991), Lado et. al. (1992). Terminology differs between researchers; Bogaert, Martens 
and Van Cauwenbergh (This volume) set out the various concepts and the relationships between them. 
For an overview of the resource-based view in  contrast to a broader set of theories in  a historical 
perspective, see Conner (1991). 
4Crown Cork and Seal Company and the Metal Container industry, RBS Case Nos. 6-373-077 and 
9378-024. 
5These analyses were carried out at the level of the business unit or line of business, not  at the firm 
level.  It may also be noted that Rumelt's study attributes less than one percent of the total business 
profit variation to corporate effects. 
6Rockwell Water Meters, HBS Case No. 9-841-060. 
7 Throughout this paper we use the shorthand term "assets" to  mean "strategic assets, distinctive 
competences and key business processes" as  defined  more  fully  in  Bogaert,  Martens and Van 
Cauwenbergh (This volume) and illustrated in their figure 1. 
8 Unless, of course, the asset were substitutable by another asset which could be accessed through one 
of the other routes (Grant, 1990, Peteraf, 1991, Barney, 1991). 
9The  term  was  first  introduced by Lippman  and  Rumelt (1982)  to  describe  the  phenomenon 
surrounding business actions and outcomes that makes it difficult for competitors to emulate strategies; 
Reed and DeFillippi  [1990]  identify three characteristics of competency that, individually or in 
combination, can generate causal ambiguity: tacimess,  complexity and specificity. 
10 See Ghemawat (1991), Ch. 1 and (1986). 
11  Barriers to asset accumulation are a prime cause of barriers to survival for young firms (See Verdin 
and Williamson, 1991) 
12 As noted by Prahalad and Hamel (1990),  core competences may be improved as a spinoff of the 
asset accumulation process.  Experience of  building a dealer network, for example, may help improve a 
finn's core competence in dealer management 
13The implications of the  asset accumulation  concept and  its characteristics for the traditional 
"structural'  entry  barriers have been explored elsewhere;  see Verdin  and Williamson,  1991  and 
Williamson and Verdin, 1992. 
14 These examples are outlined more fully in Hamel, Doz and Pralahad (1989) and Lewis (1990). 
15For a detailed discussion of the brand-related assets and how they create value, see Aaker (1991). 
16In fact, even in the'debate on the competitive impact of advertising it has been argued to  be a 
'gateway' to entry arid evidence has been produced on either side of the issue (See e.g. Verdin and 
Williamson ,1991).  The asset accumulation perspective, however, sheds new light on the question. 
17Verdin and Williamson (1991) and Williamson and Verdin (1992). 
18 This partitioning reflects data availability. 
19Information on the  ~omposition of these industries in terms of single-plant firms (i.e. 'independent 
establishments') and plants belonging to multi-plant or diversified firms ('dependent establishments') 
and their age class was available over the years 1978-1984; establishments could be tracked over time 
from one point of observation to another allowing for establishment-based entry measures to be derived 
for each industry by identifying those firms and dependent establishments who were in existence in 
1984 but not in  1978.  The variables HSERV, TORDER,  FQPUR, MAJOR,  PUSH, CHANNEL, and 
MCUST, as defmed above, were drawn from a U.S. survey of marketing expenditures (Bailey (1975». 
RDSLS  was taken from  (National Science Foundation, 1978), MEDIA  from (pICA: FTC Line of 
Business, 1976), KIE  was calculated from (BIE Capital Stock Data Base, 1978) with employment data 
from the u.S. SBA Data Base, SKILL  was computed from job classifications contained in the Census 
of Population (1980) and UN from Kokkelenberg-Sockell (1985).  For a full description of the data  see 
MacDonald (1985), Phillips (1985) and Williamson and Verdin (1992). 
20Statistical tests on these equations are based on the usual assumption that the error terms e and w are 
normally distributed  Theoretically we might expect a skew caused by higher hazard rates of small and 
medium sized businesses.  Unfortunately the dataset does not provide the necessary infonnation on 
business unit size to assess the impact of this possible distortion. 
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